


Magnus Kristoffersson

Legal Intelligence and Technological Development

A STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
GENERATIVE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION



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LEGAL INTELLIGENCE
AND TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT

*A Study of the Potential Impact of Generative
Artificial Intelligence on the Legal Profession*

MAGNUS KRISTOFFERSSON



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Abstract

This book develops a comparative account of artificial intelligence, human intelligence, and lawyer intelligence in order to clarify what is at stake when generative artificial intelligence becomes part of legal domain and work. It argues that human intelligence is multidimensional, while artificial intelligence is primarily task bound performance based on data representations, and law is a normative practice in which language creates and carries authority. On that basis, the book analyses how artificial intelligence changes legal work across the chain of input, processing, and output: what counts as legally relevant material, how opaque reasoning can still be governed, and why legal outputs are binding acts that require identifiable responsibility. It highlights risks of normative semblance, automation driven deskilling, and scalable error, and it concludes with a hybrid systems perspective and an operational framework for when artificial intelligence should be used, and when it should be constrained, to protect legality, accountability, and rule of law legitimacy.

Keywords: Generative Artificial Intelligence, Legal Profession, Human Intelligence, Accountability, Rule of Law

Preface

The idea for this book first started taking shape back in 2022, when generative AI burst onto the scene in a big way. As someone with no technical background whatsoever, I found myself face to face with large language models and what they could do, and I was genuinely fascinated. Some of the conversations I had with colleagues kept circling back to the same question: do these models actually *understand* what they're doing? (The received wisdom, of course, is that they don't.)

The models have come a long way since then, and today they're remarkably good at producing legal texts. Which got me thinking. What if intelligence, whether human or artificial, is really nothing more than arranging words in a statistically plausible order, given a certain input? What if we humans aren't all that different? After all, we hallucinate in much the same way large language models do. Sometimes it's called "confident guessing" (sw: *killgissning*), a made-up answer that just happens to sound right.

That thought sparked a growing curiosity in me, both about what human intelligence actually is and what we really mean by artificial intelligence. What I can say, having looked into it, is that there are no neat answers to either question.

What ultimately pushed me to sit down and write this book, though, is watching my own profession, the law, come under real and mounting pressure from technology. There are plenty of questions here that deserve attention, and I thought it was worth at least beginning to untangle some of them.

I make no claim to be the first person to raise these issues. Far from it. Think of this book simply as my small contribution to an important and ongoing conversation.

Finally, I owe a great deal of thanks to Professor Pasquale Pistone at the University of Salerno, Professor Jan Kellgren at Linköping University, and Professor Mats Tjernberg at Lund University. (They are listed in the order in which they kindly provided their feedback, there is absolutely

Preface

no ranking intended!) Thank you all for your generous and invaluable input on the manuscript of this book. Any errors or shortcomings that remain in this book are, of course, entirely my own.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my employer, Örebro University, for allowing me to dedicate part of my working hours (twenty per cent of my position) to research like this. I am also very grateful to the university for funding parts of the printing costs. And not least, a heartfelt thank you to Eleonor, who generously let me use her share of the departmental research funding to help make this publication possible.

Coin, Spain, 28 February 2026

Magnus